IMO’s Safety Committee (MSC110) met in mid- June and progressed work on the non-mandatory Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) Code.
Key outcomes included finalisation of 18 Chapters of the Code. Other critical aspects, such the human elements, will be addressed through an intersessional working group.
The non-mandatory MASS Code is expected to be finalised and adopted in May 2026 at the next Safety Committee meeting. A mandatory Code is expected to enter into force no earlier than 1 January 2032
The non-mandatory MASS Code is a framework for the safe, secure, and environmentally friendly operation of remotely operated and autonomous ships.
MASS & the Human Element
One of the remaining areas to be addressed by the Committee and working group members is the human element. This area is expected to require substantial effort, and there is a clear need for a holistic approach. It should be acknowledged that the human element in MASS operations will differ from traditional shipping, as human operators will increasingly work closely—and, in some cases, interdependently—with intelligent systems and automation across multiple modes of operation, whether onboard MASS or from Remote Operation Centres (ROCs).
MASS & Search and Rescue (SAR) Responsibility
Additionally, one of the key outcomes of MSC 110 was the requirement for MASS vessels to be capable of assisting persons in distress, including through a defined plan to conduct SAR operations, even in uncrewed configuration.
Given that SAR involves search, coordination, response, and rescue actions, assigning SAR responsibility to MASS raises operational and ethical complexities. These include the level of trust in technologies and AI, the maturity of autonomous systems, and the need for coordination among various players such as MASS, ROCs, Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs), non-MASS vessels.
Shipping Australia has provided detailed comments on the proposal for the assignment of SAR responsibilities to MASS vessels, recommending that the implementation be adopted on a phased and trial-based approach. This should begin with crewed MASS and progress cautiously through a standardised, process-driven pathway towards crewless MASS. This process should involve rigours pilot projects, simulation testing, and scenario-based planning to examine capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with MASS participation in SAR missions.
Given that the committee will also be addressing the human element in the coming months, we further recommend that the aspects of human-machine teaming and human-automation interaction be included in SAR discussions. As MASS operations involve multiple human operators’ roles—onboard MASS, at ROCs, and in MRCCs—and require the planning and development of joint operational procedures and frameworks to ensure effective coordination, decision-making, and accountability across all involved parties, including other entities such as VTS, pilots, and non-MASS vessels.
Recommendations on Scenario Design and Training
We consider that, when designing various SAR mission scenarios within the MASS context—whether crewed or uncrewed—for both operational requirements and the development of training frameworks, a number of key factors must be carefully included and addressed in detail. These include, levels of autonomy, trust thresholds, system and software maturity, autonomous system safety, cybersecurity measures, decision-making hierarchies, and legal and ethical dimensions of intervention and override. This approach will help close, or at least reduce, gaps that could lead to misinterpretation during implementation and will support the mitigation of potential risks.
Cybersecurity Consideration in SAR Mission
Cybersecurity, as one of the critical pillars for the safe operation of MASS, plays a key role in the SAR context. And any cyber risk should not be considered merely a technical or cyber issue, but rather a direct safety concern. Shipping Australia has recommended that a clear and structured framework be outlined to address the risk associate with falsified or manipulated SAR signals (e.g., by hackers or pirates). Accordingly, such a framework and corresponding procedures could serve as a standard protocol to guide MASS systems, human operators, central software, and AI agents in collectively assessing the trustworthiness of SAR alerts before engaging in a mission.
A more detailed article on why safety and cybercity are interwoven pillars—not only in SAR mission but, more importantly, in the entire MASS operation—and why they should go hand in hand will be published next week’s SAL newsletter under the title of “Autonomous Shipping’s Achilles Heel – Cybersecurity?”
For further information refer to the sources below:
IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 110) by DNV
PREVIEW: Maritime Safety Committee – 110th session (MSC 110), 18-27 June 2025 by IMO
Autonomous shipping by IMO
