Shippers on the spot market double-book cargo space aboard ships (Douglas, 2024; Dye, 2017; Gu et al., 2025; Zhao et al., 2019; Zhao et al., 2020).
Making ghost bookings is a secret that spot-shippers are notorious for, and guilty of, yet which hardly anybody ever talks about.
Shippers grossly overbook, especially at times of high demand (Zhao et al., 2019), to ensure that they get their cargo on a ship. It’s not just any specific sector either. The phenomenon has been observed in ferries, RoRo, and containers (Styhre, 2010).
It’s not all spot shippers, of course. And some shippers do have perfectly good commercial or operational reasons for last-minute cancellations. We’re not talking about those shippers.
Who are we talking about? It’s those spot shippers who deliberately overbook as part of an ongoing operational strategy. As long as they get what they want, well, from their perspective, they’re happy. Never mind that it causes all kinds of problems for everybody else.
There’s a word for that. It’s “selfish”.
Selfish overbooking leads to high costs
Carriers have long complained, with good reason, about shippers selfishly making ghost-bookings on ships and then not showing up with the cargo, or cancelling bookings at the last minute, because of those adverse consequences that the carriers are forced to bear.
Apart from shippers deliberately causing waste, which in a world of scarce supply and unlimited demand is immoral all by itself, ghost bookings cause a cascade of unnecessary costs throughout the supply chain (Dye, 2017). According to some estimates (cited by Gu et al., 2025), the monthly no-show rate in liner shipping can reach approximately 30%, while the annual industry-wide cost of no-shows has been estimated at US $23 billion.
Shippers and carriers both suffer
While this kind of unnecessary and selfish behaviour benefits the individual shipper who gets his or her cargo onto a ship, it harms shippers because it contributes to the increased rolling of cargo (Dye, 2017) and contributes to carriers being unable to accept bookings for other customers, leading to unnecessary inefficiency (Gu et al., 2025). It’s even been reported that double-booking for the same cargo can cause a price spike in the spot market (Douglas, 2024).
Carriers also suffer harm because they experience a loss of opportunity (i.e., space that they could have otherwise sold), loss of revenue, the low utilization of ship capacity (Zhao et al., 2020) leading to ships sailing without being full, and a low loading rate (Zhao et al., 2019). It also leads to instability in the spot market (Gu et al., 2025). Carriers also experience uncertainty because of the general randomness of it all (Gu et al., 2025).
What carriers tried to do
While there are many and varied factors as to why shippers selfishly overbook, the root cause is that shippers have an incentive to overbook and they don’t have any incentive not to overbook.
The solution, therefore, should be obvious.
Charge ‘em.
Carriers previously tried that, but they had to abandon the policy because of fierce competition (Zhao et al., 2019). Imagine you’re a selfish shipper and you’re overbooking. Carrier A wants to charge you a penalty for overbooking. Carriers B-Z won’t charge you a penalty. So, Carrier A loses business. Ultimately, Carrier A will have to back down. The commercial backlash is just too great.
A classic case of market failure
When a transaction between two parties causes spillover effects on third parties without being priced by the market, or governed by market institutions, this is known as a market failure. The classic remedy for the harm caused by market failure is policy intervention by government (The CORE Econ Team, 2019).
We already know the policy solution because the carriers tried to implement it but couldn’t make it stick.
Selfish shippers should be charged a penalty for overbooking
Government needs to charge a penalty to shippers who grossly overbook so as to impose the costs back on the selfish parties who cause them, and to induce efficiency improvements to the system as a whole.
Government regulation should require advance bookings and monitoring of bookings. They should impose steep fines on shippers who make a lot of unreasonable ghost-bookings, and who then unreasonably cancel at the last minute.
This is good policy.
It’s the only way to stop bad shipper bookings!
👻
References
The CORE Econ Team. (2019). 11. Market successes and failures. In Economy, society, and public policy. Oxford University Press. https://books.core-econ.org/espp/book/text/11.html
Douglas, M. (2024, October). Smart sailing: Maritime success strategies. Inbound Logistics. https://www.inboundlogistics.com/articles/smart-sailing-maritime-success-strategies/
Dye, R. F. (2017). Supply chain innovation teams final report. Federal Maritime Commission. https://www.fmc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/SCITFinalReport-reduced.pdf
Gu, Y., Wang, Y., & Wang, T. (2025). An approximate dynamic programming approach to dynamic slot allocation of spot containers with random arrivals, cancellations, and no-shows. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 193, Article 103837. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2024.103837
Styhre, L. (2010). Capacity utilisation in short sea shipping [Doctoral dissertation, Chalmers University of Technology]. https://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/124588.pdf
Zhao, H., Meng, Q., & Wang, Y. (2019). Exploratory data analysis for the cancellation of slot booking in intercontinental container liner shipping: A case study of Asia to US West Coast service. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 106, 243–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2019.07.009
Zhao, H., Meng, Q., & Wang, Y. (2020). Probability estimation model for the cancellation of container slot booking in long-haul transports of intercontinental liner shipping services. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 119, Article 102731. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2020.102731